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Wigner’s convoluted friends
R. Muciño and E. Okon
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City, Mexico.
Considering a complicated extension of a Wigner’s friend scenario, Frauchiger and
Renner (FR) allegedly showed that “quantum theory cannot consistently describe the
use of itself”. However, such a result has been under severe criticism, as it has been
convincingly argued to crucially depend on an implicit, non-trivial assumption regard-
ing details of the collapse mechanism. In consequence, the result is not as robust or
general as intended. On top of all this, in this work we show that a much simpler
arrangement—basically an EPR setting—is sufficient to derive a result fully analogous
to that of FR. Moreover, we claim that all lessons learned from FR’s result are essen-
tially contained within the original EPR paper. We conclude that FR’s result does not
offer any novel insights into the conceptual problems of quantum theory.
1 Introduction
In [6], Frauchiger and Renner (FR) present a result allegedly proving that “quantum
theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself”. FR consider a complicated ex-
tension of a Wigner’s friend scenario, involving two labs and four observers, and the
conflict is argued to primarily arise from the assumption that quantum mechanics can
be consistently applied to complex, macroscopic systems. In more detail, the result is
cast in the form of a no-go theorem arguing for the mutual incompatibility of three
assumptions: (C), demanding consistency between different observers, (S), establishing
that measurements have single outcomes and (Q), (allegedly) capturing the universal
validity of quantum mechanics.
However, as it has been convincingly argued elsewhere, [1, 10, 11, 9, 4, 12], the FR
result seems to depend on an implicit, non-trivial, idiosyncratic interpretation of the
quantum formalism, particularly regarding the collapse postulate. Concretely, in effect
it is assumed that when a measurement is carried out inside of a closed lab, such a
measurement leads to a collapse for inside observers, but does not do so for outside
observers. Once one recognizes such an assumption, it comes as no surprise the fact
that a contradiction is reached. Moreover, once one recognizes such an assumption, it
comes as a surprise that an arrangement as complicated as that considered by FR is
necessary to derive a conflict.
In this work we show that a much simpler setting, basically an EPR scenario, is
sufficient to arrive at a result fully analogous to that of FR. Moreover, we claim that
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the true consequences of FR’s result seem to contain not much more than what can
be learned from the original EPR paper [5]. With these objectives in mind, our short
manuscript is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe FR’s work and in section
3 we show how a fully analogous result can be achieved in a much simpler setting: an
EPR scenario. We also comment on what this means regarding potential consequences
of FR’s result. We close with some final comments in section 4.
2 The FR argument
We start by describing the experimental arrangement considered by FR. It contains
four different agents, F, F, W and W and two labs, L and L. F is inside L and F inside
L and W and W are outside of the respective labs and can perform measurements on
them. Finally, there is a communication channel from L to L.
The experiment runs in steps as follows:
Step 1: F prepares a quantum coin in the state
√
1
3
|h〉+
√
2
3
|t〉 and measures it. If
she finds h, she prepares an electron in the state |↓〉, if she finds t, she prepares
it in the state |→〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉+ |↓〉). She then sends the prepared electron to F.
Step 2: F measures the electron in the {|↑〉 , |↓〉} basis.
Step 3: W measures L in the following basis:
|o〉
L
=
1√
2
[|h〉
L
− |t〉
L
] ,
|f〉
L
=
1√
2
[|h〉
L
+ |t〉
L
]
(with |h〉
L
and |t〉
L
the states of L after F measures the coin and finds the corre-
sponding result). W then announces her result.
Step 4: W measures L in the following basis:
|o〉
L
=
1√
2
[|↓〉
L
− |↑〉
L
] ,
|f〉
L
=
1√
2
[|↓〉
L
+ |↑〉
L
]
2
(with |↓〉
L
and |↑〉
L
the states of L after F measures the spin and finds the corre-
sponding result).
FR then analyze the experiment assuming (C), (S) and (Q), together with the
non-trivial assumption mentioned in the introduction, namely:
(H) When a measurement is carried out inside of a closed lab, such a measurement
leads to a collapse for inside observers, but it does not lead to a collapse for
outside observers.
By doing so, they consider several implications (see Table 3 in [6]):
1. If F finds t, then she sends F the electron in state |→〉. If so, F reasons employing
(H), after F measures, W will assign to L the state |f〉
L
so W’s measurement will
result for sure in f. That is:
If F finds t, she knows that W will find f with certainty. (1)
2. If F finds ↑, then she reasons that F must have gotten t. But we know from (1)
that that implies that W will find f with certainty. Then, using (C) we conclude:
If F finds ↑, then she knows that W will find f with certainty. (2)
3. Given (H), according to W, after step 2 the system L+L is in the state
√
1
3
|h〉
L
|↓〉
L
+
√
2
3
|t〉
L
|→〉
L
.
But that state is orthogonal to |o〉
L
|↓〉
L
. As a result, employing (2) and (C):
If W finds o, then she knows that W will find f with certainty. (3)
4. Finally, using (3) and (C) we conclude:
If W announces she got o, then W knows she will find f with certainty. (4)
The problem is that, at the same time, given (H), according to W the state of L+L
after step 2 is given by √
1
3
|h〉
L
|↓〉
L
+
√
2
3
|t〉
L
|→〉
L
,
3
which can also be written as
1
2
√
3
[|o〉
L
|o〉
L
− |o〉
L
|f〉
L
+ |f〉
L
|o〉
L
] +
√
3
2
|f〉
L
|f〉
L
.
Given that |o〉
L
|o〉
L
has a non-zero coefficient, W concludes that it is possible for her
to get the result o, even if W also gets o. But this is inconsistent with (4).
As advertised, the conjunction of (S), (C), (Q) and (H) is inconsistent. To see
that H indeed plays a crucial role in the argument, we note that, when F measures
the coin, it is assumed that, even though the initial state is a superposition of h and
t, she will find either h or t (and similarly for all other measurements). Moreover,
for future predictions, F assumes her measurement caused a collapse. That is, for
future predictions, F uses the state corresponding to what she found, not the full
superposition. Only if this is the case, F will conclude that if she found t, then W will
find f (see the first implication above). At the same time, W, for instance, assigns to
L the fully superposition of h and t, even after F’s measurement. Only because of this,
W concludes that if she finds o, then she knows that W will find f with certainty (see
the third implication above). The result of FR is arrived at precisely because, even
though each agent assumes a collapse happens when she measures, outside observers
assume such measurements don’t cause a collapse; that is, they assume H (for similar
analyses see [9, 10, 11]).
Is FR’s result interesting? We don’t think so. By depending on (H), the argument
has a very limited range of applicability. There are a few interpretations, such a
Relational Quantum Mechanics or Consistent Histories, that do seem to assume (H),
or something similar, but they also try to negate either (C) or (S) explicitly. It is not
clear if any of these approaches is really satisfactory, what is clear is that FR’s result
does not help clarify the issue. In sum, no known interpretation that is unambiguous
regarding the collapse postulate is really affected by FR’s result.
In any case, what we want to show next is that a result fully analogous to the one
constructed in [6] can be arrived at via a much simpler arrangement, namely a simple
EPR scenario (in Bohm’s formulation in terms of spin-1
2
particles, [3]).
3 The EPR-Wigner experiment
Consider the following experimental procedure:
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• F prepares a singlet inside of her lab, then she sends to W one of the particles of
the pair and measures the other.
That’s it. Now, given that the state is a singlet, the following implication follows:
If F finds ↑, she knows that W will find ↓ with certainty. (5)
However, at the same time, given (H), F knows that, even after F measures, W assigns
to the pair of particles a singlet state. From this it follows that, even if F finds ↑, F
knows that W predicts a 50% chance to find ↑. As a result, by (C), even if F finds ↑,
F predicts that W has a 50% chance to find ↑. But this, of course, is inconsistent with
(5).
In sum, by considering this extremely simple scenario, and without having to con-
sider measurements over complex, macroscopic systems, we arrive at a contradiction
which is fully analogous to the one encountered by FR. After all, if we think about
it, it comes as no surprise that if one considers an EPR pair, and one assumes, with
(H), that the measurement on one particle does not change the state of the other, then
inconsistencies may arise.
In order to remove any lingering doubts that our results is in fact fully equivalent to
FR’s, we can dress-up our setting to make it more like theirs. In particular, we could
consider, as FR, two labs, four observers and a communication channel connecting the
labs. Then we could have F measure a quantum coin prepared in the state 1√
2
(|h〉+ |t〉)
and have her send to F an electron in the state |↓〉, if she finds h, and |↑〉, if she finds
t (all this is equivalent to F preparing a singlet, sending away one of the particles and
measuring the other). Then F would measure the spin of the electron in the {|↓〉 , |↑〉}
basis (this step is superfluous). Next W would measure the state of F’s lab in the
{|h〉
L
, |t〉
L
} basis and would announce her result (this allows for W to know F’s result
so that W can arrive at a contradiction, but this is not necessary as F himself can
find a contradiction). Finally, W would measure the state of F’s lab in the {|↓〉
L
, |↑〉
L
}
basis. Then, by a reasoning fully analogous to that used by FR, we would conclude
that if W announces that she found, say, t, then W will predict that she will find ↑
with certainty. However, by (H), she will also compute the state of both labs to be a
superposition and predict a non-zero chance to find ↓ (just as in the EPR case, F can
reason analogously to arrive at a contradiction).
So what can we say about the fact that FR’s result can be arrived at in a simple
EPR scenario? Well, as is well-known (and as is clear from the title), the primary
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objective of the EPR paper was to assess whether standard quantum mechanics is
complete. To do so, the authors (implicitly) assume a locality principle that could be
summarized as follows:
(L) If two systems are far apart, then actions on one cannot have instantaneous
effects on the other.
Note that, within an EPR scenario, with two entangled particles sent to two separate
locations, by assuming (L), one concludes that an action on one of the particles cannot
affect the other and, in particular, that a measurement on one of the particles cannot
cause a collapse on the other. Clearly this coincides with what the assumption (H)
would predict for such a scenario. That is, in an EPR scenario, to assume (L) leads to
the same consequences as assuming (H). If this is so, we conclude that what one learns
from FR’s work must be equivalent to what one learns from the EPR paper. So, what
does one learn from the EPR paper? As we said, it seeks to assess the completeness
of standard quantum mechanics and concludes, implicitly assuming (C) and (S), that
(L) and completeness are inconsistent. We see that, if we identify (L) and (H) in this
scenario, then FR’s result is indeed equivalent to that of the EPR paper.
It is important to point out that the recognition that FR’s result is equivalent to
what one can learn from an EPR scenario, implies that any theory that satisfactorily
explains the latter will have no trouble regarding the former. That is, any theory
with resources to predict consistent results for an EPR experiment will stay clear from
trouble regarding FR’s no-go result.
Before moving on, we would like to compare the disclosed equivalence between
FR and EPR, with the claim in [4] that FR’s work can be read as a rephrasing of
Hardy’s theorem [7, 8] (in fact, FR’s proposal is said to build upon Hardy’s work). We
believe, however, that exactly in the same way that Bell’s theorem is stronger than
EPR, Hardy’s result is stronger than FR’s. As we explained above, EPR proves that
locality and completeness are inconsistent, but leaves the door open for local hidden-
variable theories to be viable. In [2], building on that, Bell demonstrates that all local
theories are incompatible with the predictions of standard quantum mechanics. Hardy’s
theorem constitutes an alternative proof of Bell’s theorem for the case of deterministic
local theories, so, with Bell, goes further than EPR. FR’s work, on the other hand,
shows that completeness and (H) are inconsistent, but does not even attempt to prove
that all theories satisfying (H) must make different predictions than standard quantum
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mechanics.1 It seems clear, then, that FR is not equivalent to Hardy’s theorem—the
latter is strictly stronger.
4 Conclusions
Frauchiger and Renner try to show that “quantum theory cannot consistently describe
the use of itself”. To do so, they consider an elaborate, extended Wigner’s friend
scenario involving four agents, two labs and the supposition that quantum mechanics
can be applied to macroscopic systems. Elsewhere it has been shown that FR’s result
is not as robust or general as intended, as it depends on a highly non-trivial assumption
regarding the collapse mechanism—namely, that when a measurement is carried out
inside of a closed lab, such a measurement leads to a collapse for inside observers, but
does not do so for outside observers.
FR’s proposal trades on the vague nature of the collapse postulate—on the ambi-
guity as to what causes it and what it entails—to arrive at a conflict. That puts FR
in the company of many “results” of the past hundred years, such as delayed choice
arrangements or quantum erasers, that also exploit the conceptual lagoons of standard
quantum mechanics to arrive at alleged contradictions or paradoxes. Of course, as soon
as one resolves such conceptual lagoons in a satisfactory way, all those problematic re-
sults disappear.
In this work we have shown that FR’s result can be derived in a much simpler set-
ting, and without having to assume that observers and labs can enter into Schrödinger
cat-like states. That is, we have shown that a result fully analogous to that of FR
can be arrived at by considering a simple EPR scenario. Moreover, we have argued
that any lesson that could be learned from FR’s result is essentially contained in the
original EPR paper. We conclude that FR’s result is even less illuminating than pre-
viously recognized as it does not offer any novel insights into the conceptual problems
of quantum theory.
1To prove this, as Bell or Hardy, and unlike FR, one would need to introduce state descriptions
other than those of standard quantum mechanics and would have to allow for alternative measurement
settings for different runs of the experiment. It is also important to point out that Hardy’s proof works
for all entangled states, except the singlet. Therefore, the fact that we constructed a scenario equivalent
to that of FR, but with a singlet, shows that FR’s result cannot be equivalent to Hardy’s.
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